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E-Capital: The Link between the
Stock Market and the Labor Market
in the 1990s
OVER THE PAST decade, new technologies based on computer software
began to transform the production and distribution of goods and to form
the basis of new goods in the U.S. economy. The value of the stock mar-
ket rose tremendously, with many of the largest increases among firms
implementing the new technologies. Figure 1 depicts this increase in rela-
tion to the replacement cost of the inventories and plant and equipment of
corporations. One of the reasons for the upsurge, according to the view
developed in this paper, was an increase in the value of installed physical
capital thanks to an unexpected rise in the demand for capital. A more
important reason was the accumulation of intangibles, demand for which
increased even more rapidly. Internet companies are valued almost exclu-
sively for their intangibles: as of November 7, 2000, Yahoo! had a value
of $37 billion but only $158 million of physical capital. 
The workers who develop and use the new technologies are mostly
college graduates. Both the number of college-educated workers and their
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9760-04  BPEA Hall  12/21/2000 14:17  Page 73to all college graduates for their labor to dollars paid to all other workers
rose from 0.61 in 1990 to 0.89 in 1998. Figure 2 shows the increase in 
constant-dollar earnings per worker by educational attainment from 1990
to 1998. College graduates enjoyed much larger increases than those with
less education, except for the lowest education group; people with gradu-
ate training saw even greater increases. 
Despite the evidence from the stock market that corporations have accu-
mulated valuable technological resources apart from their physical capital,
and despite the huge increase in demand for college graduates that derives
from the new technology, productivity growth rose only a little in the
1990s. The data I use in this paper show a Solow residual, or total factor
productivity growth, of 0.9 percent a year from 1990 to 1998. This ﬁgure,
which is similar to the findings of other recent studies, suggests that the
idea of a technological revolution in the United States is overblown. Skep-
tics of the importance of new technology tend to view the high stock mar-
ket valuation of U.S. corporations as an irrational bubble and note that it is
unsupported by comparable improvement in current productivity or proﬁt.
This paper pursues the argument that I have developed elsewhere that
today’s high stock market valuations should be taken seriously as a mea-
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Figure 1. Traditional Measure of Tobin’s q for Physical Capital, 1990–99
a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Hall (2000).
a. Ratio of market value of nonfarm, nonﬁnancial corporations to replacement cost of their physical capital and inventories.
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capital—e-capital—to characterize these resources. I view the production
of goods and services as employing the services of e-capital along with
machines, college-graduate workers (c-workers), and workers who have
not graduated from college (h-workers). The technology for making
e-capital is simple: c-workers by themselves make e-capital. No other
factors are required. I use the standard tools of production economics to
understand changes in factor intensities and factor prices, without invok-
ing significant changes over time in the production function for goods
and services. 
A ﬁrm’s e-capital is a body of technical and organizational know-how.
Much e-capital involves the use of computers and software, but it is the
business methods based on computers, not the computers themselves, that
constitute e-capital. Computers count as ordinary plant and equipment.
E-capital-intensive firms handle huge flows of transactions accurately


















Figure 2. Increases in Average Annual Real Earnings from 1990 to 1998 by Level of
Educationa
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey.
a. Adjusted for inﬂation by the implicit deﬂator for private GDP.
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than do traditional firms, because they have developed systems to get
things right the ﬁrst time. Industries with high levels of e-capital relative to
employment include insurance, securities brokers, communications, and
equipment manufacturing. For example, online brokers such as E*Trade
prosper by substituting web servers and software for people.
E-capital is also transforming low-technology sectors such as retailing:
Wal-Mart is a leading example of an e-capital-based modern enterprise. Its
market capitalization of $219 billion on November 7 was more than seven
times its book value. The company has harnessed modern technology to bring
about huge improvements in retail productivity and customer satisfaction.
Why did the e-capital revolution occur in the 1990s and not before?
After all, computers and college degrees are hardly innovations of that
decade. I explain the change in the 1990s in terms of an upsurge in saving
resulting at least in part from technical progress in forming e-capital. This
saving does not appear in the accounts of corporations or in the national
income accounts, because the income that is saved is quickly spent on
forming more e-capital in the same corporations. The evidence of this
saving is indirect—it is manifested in the rising stock market.
Research on earnings trends in the labor market in the 1990s and earlier
has gravitated toward the hypothesis of skill-biased technical change,
particularly because other ideas, such as competition from low-wage
workers in other countries, have been shown to have little role. This
hypothesis—that the nature of technical change is such that it increases
ﬁrms’demand for more-skilled labor—is a close relative of the view devel-
oped in this paper. The skill-bias view sees the production function as
shifting over time, whereas the e-capital model explains the same shift
through the increasing use of a factor left out of the skill-bias production
function. Given the large increase in the fraction of workers with a col-
lege education, the dramatic rise in the relative earnings of college gradu-
ates can only be explained, in this view, by a large skill bias in the limited
amount of technical change that has occurred. I calculate the amount of
that change and find that it exceeds the amount that is consistent with the
view that the productivity of h-workers cannot have declined during the
1990s. The explanation I offer, on the other hand, invokes capital accu-
mulation. Increasing demand for e-capital increased the demand for col-
lege graduates. The e-capital model offers a more plausible version of the
skill-bias explanation of events in the labor market. The model also incor-
76 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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literature on skill bias.
The e-capital model explains the low level of measured productivity
growth despite the strong evidence in the stock market and in the earn-
ings of college graduates that a revolution is under way. The standard
Solow residual treats all c-workers as working to make goods and services.
Total factor inputs in the production of goods and services are overstated
by the amount of the services of c-workers actually used to make e-capital.
This overstatement is more than offset by the failure to include e-capital as
an input in standard productivity calculations. My calculation of total fac-
tor productivity growth in goods and services using the standard frame-
work—0.9 percent a year—overstates actual productivity growth, which is
barely positive in my model. The driving force behind rising output and the
rising stock market is technical progress in making e-capital, coupled with
the formation of large amounts of e-capital, according to my model.
The methods used here are relentlessly nonparametric. The Solow
residual is the primary tool. In addition, I test the implications of the
e-capital model against the weak axiom of cost minimization—in effect,
asking why e-capital was not used before 1990 even though it was prac-
tical to produce it. I also use a nonparametric approach to measure skill
bias.
A related aspect of this paper is its method for specifying key parame-
ter values. The method fails to rise even to the level of calibration, much
less estimation. Instead I choose values of adjustment costs and other pa-
rameters in such a way that the resulting story seems to make sense. 
Erik Brynjolfsson and Shinkyu Yang provide supporting evidence
about e-capital.
2 They demonstrate that firms with higher levels of
observed investment in information technology (IT)—a likely correlate of
e-capital—have much higher valuations than do other firms. In the frame-
work of this paper, their results suggest that the typical IT firm possesses
about nine dollars of e-capital for each dollar of observed IT capital.
The research approach adopted in this paper is to see whether a uniﬁed
explanation can be found for the dramatic events of the 1990s. I do not
claim that this explanation is superior to others. I do not believe that any
research has answered the question of whether the stock market has
behaved rationally, with respect to either its low values from 1973 to 1989
Robert E. Hall 77
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3 Rather, I develop a complete
account of some important events of the 1990s, under the assumption of
market rationality, that may persuade some readers that the assumption is
not as farfetched as they thought.
The paper does not tackle a full general-equilibrium consideration of
the events of the 1990s. It restricts its formal analysis to that of production.
The other important part of a model with one kind of output is consump-
tion and saving, where saving includes the inflow of capital from abroad.
According to the e-capital view, the U.S. economy did a huge amount of
saving in the 1990s, which would be revealed in a new set of national
income and product accounts that included the production of e-capital
and the income earned from that production. It is a challenge to consump-
tion theory to explain why the saving occurred. That challenge is not taken
up in this paper.
The Stock Market
A premise of this paper is the rationality of the stock market, or, more
precisely, of securities markets generally. The value of all securities that
are claims on corporations reveals the value of the business assets of those
corporations. In an irrational market, securities might be worth more than
the underlying assets—a suspicion today given the facts in figure 1 for
recent years. Or they might be worth less—a suspicion supported by the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when the stock market valued capital at about
50 cents on the dollar.
4 Two tasks face the researcher who invokes the
hypothesis of stock market rationality: understanding the high valuations
of the 1990s and understanding the low valuations of the 1970s and 1980s.
This paper undertakes only the ﬁrst task.
Valuation deals with four different measures of value, all of which
should be the same, according to received principles:
—the observed market value of the securities of corporations;
—the present value of future receipts of the owners of those securities;
78 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
3. See Hall (2000) for a discussion of Bond and Cummins’s rejection of rationality in the
last issue of this series.
4. Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss (1980).
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—the market values of the various business assets of corporations.
The relation between the ﬁrst two measures, the market prices of securities
and their future payouts, has been the subject of far too much research in
finance to begin to cite. A fair summary of this research is that there has
been no definitive finding of departure from the valuation principle: that
the price of a security is the present value of its future returns. It is true that
the values of most stocks today are far above the present value of any rea-
sonable prediction of future dividends. But formal testing also has to con-
sider the terminal value, when a shareholder liquidates a position, and the
present value of liquidation easily makes up for the shortfall in the value of
dividends. Tests have relatively low statistical power as a result. The
absence of definitive evidence of the failure of the valuation principle is
not, however, strong evidence in favor of rationality.
The third measure of value, the present discounted value of nonﬁnancial
corporate cash flows, is called intrinsic value. Research on this measure
has been sparser—the work of William Brainard, John Shoven, and Lau-
rence Weiss remains the most prominent.
5 Their findings are supported
by the recent work of Steven Bond and Jason Cummins.
6 Both studies
find that intrinsic value in all years roughly equals the estimated replace-
ment cost of plant and equipment. There is little room for intangibles in the
1990s (as shown by Bond and Cummins), and the low stock market in
1980 is a deep mystery (as Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss demonstrate). 
The replacement cost of plant and equipment differs from its market
value when there are adjustment costs. In times of rapid growth, the price
of installed capital will exceed its replacement cost. Tobin’s q—the ratio of
the two values—will exceed one. I estimate Tobin’s q for U.S. corporations
in this paper and find that its rise in the 1990s is an important but not the
dominant explanation of the rise in securities values.
There are huge differences between the internal cash ﬂows of corpora-
tions and the cash paid out to securities owners.
7 In the late 1970s and
early 1980s when the stock market was depressed, securities owners were
actually paying cash in to corporations, in contrast to normal years, when
Robert E. Hall 79
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7. See Hall (2000) for data.
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holders thought that corporations were dissipating value in a way not cap-
tured by projections of cash flow, the low value of the stock market in
that period might make sense. Similarly, shareholders in the 1990s may
have thought that the activities of corporations were adding to later pay-
outs in a way not captured by cash-flow projections. Because there is a
lot of room for differences between the cash ﬂows projected by Brainard,
Shoven, and Weiss and their followers, and cash ﬂows received by securi-
ties owners, the gap between the value of securities and intrinsic value
can be large. The question is whether it can be as negative as it was in 1980
or as positive as it was in 1999 without invoking market irrationality. 
A Four-Factor Model
The model that I develop in this section entertains the hypothesis that
securities markets reveal the approximate value of the business assets of
corporations. These assets are physical capital and e-capital. (I will add
inventories in the application but will not clutter the development of the
model with them.) The model hypothesizes adjustment costs for both types
of capital, so that market value departs from replacement cost. As noted in
the introduction, the model distinguishes two kinds of workers: c-workers,
who have graduated from college, and h-workers, who have not. The acqui-
sition price of e-capital is determined by the wages of c-workers and their
productivity in making e-capital.
Technology and Productivity Growth
Deﬁne the following notation:
et = quantity of e-capital
kt = quantity of physical capital (plant and equipment)
ct = labor input of c-workers (college graduates)
ht = labor input of h-workers (not college graduates)
yt = output
rt
e = rental price of e-capital
rt
k = rental price of physical capital
wt
c = wage rate for c-workers
wt
h = wage rate for h-workers
80 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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y = price of output
pt
e = price of e-capital
pt
k = price of physical capital, and
At = an index of Hicks-neutral, or output-augmenting, technical
change.




t is the amount of c-labor used as an input to goods and services
production. I assume constant returns (but not competition) and perform
the Solow-Divisia exercise on the production function. That is, I take the
time derivatives of both sides, replace the derivatives of the production
function with the corresponding factor prices, and approximate the time
derivatives of the form  with the discrete approximation   ln x:
Here Ct is total cost:
The observed rate of change of output is the rate of productivity growth
(the Solow residual,   log At, which measures the shift of the production
function)
8 plus the weighted average of the rates of change of the factor
inputs, with cost shares serving as weights. The use of cost shares avoids
Solow’s original assumption of competition but requires explicit mea-
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approximation to the production function, which encounters no problems when an input
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9 I actually measure the shares as the
equally weighted average of the shares at times t – 1 and t: a measure
called, by its modest inventors, the superlative index of total factor input.
10
Adjustment Costs
One reason why the stock market rose in the 1990s was unexpected
growth in demand for both physical capital and e-capital. For the theory of
investment in physical capital I adopt the standard neoclassical invest-
ment model with adjustment costs, as formalized by Andrew Abel and oth-
ers.
11 This model combines Dale Jorgenson’s theory of the demand for
installed capital with James Tobin’s theory of the supply of installed capi-
tal. The model stands as the accepted modern paradigm of investment with
smooth adjustment. I deﬁne qt
kas Tobin’s q for physical capital, the ratio of
the price of installed capital to the price of new capital goods. I take the
adjustment technology to be quadratic with constant returns to scale, and
so the ﬁrst-order condition for the supply of installed capital is
When capital is stationary, qt
k takes its equilibrium value of 1. When ris-
ing demand for capital results in growth of the capital stock, the value of
installed capital rises above the price of capital goods by an amount pro-
portional to the rate of growth of the capital stock. Equation (4) is the
supply function for the internal capital market.
The parameter  t
kmeasures adjustment costs. I add the time subscript to
account for the asymmetry of the installation process—it is much cheaper
to install capital than to remove it. 
My speciﬁcation of adjustment costs for e-capital differs in one respect
from the model just described. In equation (4) the denominator in the
fraction is a scaling variable that results in an adjustment technology with
constant returns to scale. In the case of e-capital, it would not make sense
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ment costs for e-capital by physical capital:
Otherwise the setup for e-capital is the same as for physical capital, with
an installed price ratio qt
e and an adjustment parameter  t
e.
Measuring Capital and the Price of Installed Capital
The flow of purchases of new plant and equipment, xt, is observable. I
calculate the stock of capital from the perpetual inventory equation,
where  
k is the rate of deterioration of physical capital. Note that equa-
tion (6) is a quadratic that must be solved for the capital stock. Then I
calculate the price of installed capital by solving equation (4):
The market value of physical capital is
For e-capital I adapt the measurement approach in my previous paper
on this topic.
12 Flows of investment in e-capital are invisible. But the mar-
ket value of e-capital is the difference between the observed total market
value of ﬁrms and the market value of their physical capital:
I assume that one year of work by a c-worker creates (1 +  )
t units of 
e-capital—no other factors are required to make e-capital. The variable  
is the rate of growth of productivity in the creation of e-capital. An imme-
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of uninstalled e-capital starting in period t + 1 is pt
e = (1 +  )
–t wt
c.
Now consider the supply condition for installed e-capital, equation (5),
and the value relation,
These are two equations in two unknowns, et and qt
e. Figure 3 describes
their solution. Equation (10) is a downward-sloping hyperbola, whereas
marginal adjustment cost, equation (5), is an upward-sloping line. The
intersection occurs at the inferred quantity of e-capital, et, and its value in
relation to acquisition cost, q
e.
Notice that the position of the marginal adjustment cost schedule
depends on the lagged value of e-capital. Hence the procedure makes the
current value of e-capital a function of the lagged value. The procedure
defines a recursion for calculating e-capital. My earlier paper shows that
the recursion is quite stable.
13 Although it requires an assumed initial
value, the calculated values for later years are not sensitive to the initial
value. I use an initial value of zero in my calculations.
Rental Prices for Physical and E-Capital
The rental price for installed physical capital is
Here rt
f,k is the risk-adjusted interest rate for physical capital, τ is the cor-
porate tax rate, and z is the present discounted value of tax deductions
associated with physical capital.
14To evaluate the expectation of the future
market value of installed capital, I assume, first, that the future price of
uninstalled capital, pt+1
k , is approximately known at time t, and that 
q returns to its normal value of one at a rate  . Reversion of q to its mean
is an implication of almost any general-equilibrium model.
15 Thus I 
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Here rt
f,e is the financial return required by the market, adjusted for the
risk associated with holding a unit of e-capital during period t. The vari-
able  e is the rate of deterioration of e-capital. In this formula I assume that
the costs of producing e-capital are deductible for tax purposes as they
are incurred.
Allocating C-Workers between the Two Sectors
I assume that the adjustment costs for e-capital take the form of work













































































Figure 3. Price and Quantity of E-Capital in Equilibrium
Source: Author’s calculations based on equations (5) and (10) in the text.
a. Given e-capital in the previous period.
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q, = ct – ct
e, are employed at producing goods and services.
The model developed in this section enables the calculation of all of the
quantities and prices needed to tell the e-capital story. The values of the
two kinds of capital and their installed prices account, by construction,
for the level of securities prices. The quantities of factors used in the pro-
duction of goods and services enable the calculation of productivity and
the testing of the story within production theory.
Parameter Values
Table 1 shows the values of the parameters I use in the subsequent cal-
culations. As noted earlier, I make no pretense of formally estimating the
parameters and draw on the existing literature only in the most general
way. I candidly admit that I have chosen the parameter values to achieve
what seems to me the most reasonable version of the e-capital story.
My earlier paper discusses evidence on the value of the adjustment
parameter for plant and equipment,  k.16 One body of research on adjust-
ment costs and speeds infers Tobin’s q from securities values, whereas a
second body uses other methods. The value used here is consistent with
some research in the second category. All research that does form q from
securities prices finds slower adjustment by far than this value implies. I
believe that such slow adjustment rates, and correspondingly high levels of
adjustment costs, are the result of severe specification errors in the esti-
mation equations. Measures of q from securities values are completely
unsuccessful in isolating the actual value of installed plant and equipment;
the measures are contaminated by the value of intangibles. I assign a value
for the downward adjustment cost for e-capital that is ten times the upward
cost, to capture the near irreversibility of investment.
Data
My aim is to consider the private economy exclusive of agriculture
and households. It is not possible to obtain all the necessary data for
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nonfarm, nonhousing businesses. Data for investment in physical capital
are the sum of private ﬁxed investment in industrial structures, commercial
structures, mining construction, and nonresidential equipment and soft-
ware, less tractors and agricultural equipment.
The market value of securities of nonfarm, nonfinancial corporations
is taken from my previous paper.17 I measure e-capital for this sector only,
which differs from the coverage of the other data by excluding noncorpo-
rate businesses and financial corporations. From the value of securities I
subtract the value of inventories, estimated as private nonfarm inventories
multiplied by the ratio of physical capital for nonfarm, nonfinancial cor-
porations to capital calculated from the series described above. I also sub-
tract the value of capital for nonfarm, nonfinancial corporations as the
product of their calculated capital, the deflator for the investment series,
and my estimate of q for physical capital.
Data for earnings by education are from the Census Bureau’s Current
Population Survey, tables P-28 and P-29 for 1986–90. I rescaled the data
for compensation and hours to levels for the private nonfarm economy
from the national income and product accounts. The calculation assumes
that annual hours per worker are roughly the same for c-workers and
h-workers and that the mix of the two types of workers is the same in the
private nonfarm economy as in the entire economy covered by the Cur-
rent Population Survey.
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Table 1. Assumed Parameter Values in the E-Capital Model
Parameter Interpretation Value
 k Upward adjustment cost for physical capital 3.00
 e Upward adjustment cost for e-capital 3.00
Downward adjustment cost for e-capital 30.00
 k Deterioration rate for physical capital, per year 0.10
 e Deterioration rate for e-capital, per year 0.06
  Rate of growth of productivity in creating e-capital 0.03
τ Corporate tax rate 0.34
z Present value of tax deductions for physical capital 0.72
  Rate of mean reversion of qe, per year 0.20
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Figure 4 shows the value of q
k that results from applying equation (7)
with a value for the adjustment coefficient of 3 at annual rates. The capi-
tal stock grew throughout the period, so that q was always above 1. Growth
increased after 1993, resulting in rising values of q.
Figure 5 shows the calculated quantity of e-capital over the period,
and figure 6 shows the corresponding values of q
e. Figure 7 decomposes
the rise in the stock market in the 1990s into the various components in the
measurement system of this paper. At the bottom is the movement of
inventories, a small part of the story. The next line up adds the value of
plant and equipment without including changes associated with q
k. The
line just above that adds the effect of rising scarcity of plant and equipment
recorded by q
k. The next-to-last line adds e-capital without q
e; this is the
single largest factor in the rise of the market. The top line, the actual value
of the market, includes the considerable extra effect of the rising scarcity
value of e-capital.
Almost every other discussion of the rise of the stock market in the
1990s has a completely different character. These discussions attribute
the rise to lower discount rates resulting from lower equity premiums,
more widespread ownership of stock, and the like. Is there a conflict
between the two approaches to understanding the stock market?
In general equilibrium the value of the stock market obeys two princi-
ples. It is simultaneously the value of what corporations own (disregarding
debt for the moment) and the present value of receipts anticipated by
shareholders. The decomposition of value in figure 7 tracks the first prin-
ciple. I have not tried here to measure any present values, because they
are difﬁcult and unnecessary for my purposes. It is important to understand
that there is nothing causal about ﬁgure 7. It should not be read as saying
that, because corporations happened to invest in e-capital, the stock mar-
ket rose. The exogenous forces accounting for the events displayed in the
ﬁgure are complex. They include the willingness of U.S. residents to save
enough to invest in huge quantities of plant, equipment, and e-capital (with
help from abroad), and possibly changes in the equity premium.
18
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18. For an example of full general-equilibrium modeling of these issues, see Abel
(1999).
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Figure 4. Estimated q for Physical Capital, 1990–99
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Figure 5. Estimated Stock of E-Capital, 1990–99
Source: Author’s calculations based on equations (5) and (10) in the text.
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Figure 6. Estimated q for E-Capital, 1990–99

















Figure 7. Accounting for E-Capital in Stock Market Capitalization, 1990–99a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Market capitalization of the stock market plus the estimated market value of other claims as described in Hall (2000).
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Many observers appear to believe that the modest acceleration of pro-
ductivity in the 1990s is inconsistent with the enormous increase in stock
market valuations. How can economic changes that add less than a per-
centage point to productivity growth result in a growth of securities val-
ues to more than double the value of inventories, plant, and equipment?
The calculations in this section suggest that there is no contradiction. Pro-
ductivity growth is hard to change. Even the massive transformation of the
economy in the e-capital story does not imply much change in productiv-
ity growth. That transformation was mostly the result of saving and capital
accumulation, not productivity growth, according to the e-capital story.
Table 2 shows two productivity calculations for the goods and services
sector. The table’s upper panel applies the ideas of this paper by adding
e-capital as an input and removing the fraction of c-workers employed in
the production of e-capital. The lower panel reports standard calculations.
The calculations are made from discrete changes from 1990 to 1998 with-
out using the intervening data. Spencer Star and I have demonstrated that
almost nothing is gained from using annual changes rather than changes
over longer periods.
19
The upper panel of table 2 shows that the input of e-capital rose sub-
stantially (this measurement uses the method discussed in footnote 8),
although the average weight given to e-capital is only 9 percent. Employ-
ment of c-workers grew about 1 percent over the period, and the share
given to them here is only 23.9 percent, because 49 percent of c-workers
were not employed in this sector but rather were making e-capital. Just
under half of the cost of goods and services comes from h-workers. Pro-
ductivity remained unchanged over the eight years.
In the lower panel e-capital does not play a role, and all c-workers are
treated as employed in the goods and services sector. Because the addition
of more c-workers does not completely offset the removal of e-capital,
the growth of total factor inputs and of the productivity residual is some-
what higher, at 0.9 percent annually.
20
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Is the e-capital story consistent with standard production theory? A
basic property of the theory is the weak axiom of cost minimization
(WACM).21 The WACM test operates on normalized data, showing the
packages of inputs needed to produce one unit of output in each of two
years, here 1990 and 1998. The unit of output is larger in the later year to
account for Hicks-neutral productivity growth during the intervening
years. Thus the 1990 input package did produce one unit of output in 1990
and could have produced one bigger unit of output in 1998. Similarly, the
1998 input package could have produced one unit in 1990 and did produce
one unit in 1998. The WACM test asks two intuitive questions:
—Could the economy have saved money in 1990 by producing a unit of
output with the 1998 input package instead of the actual 1990 input pack-
age? In other words, does the 1998 input package cost less at 1990 factor
prices than the 1990 input package? If so, something is wrong.
92 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
21. Varian (1984). 




Item E-capital capital graduates graduates Change
With e-capital
Input change, 1990–98 ... 35.4 1.1 35.4
Input weight 9.0 23.5 23.9 48.1






Input change, 1990–98 ... 35.4 28.3 35.4
Input weight 21.9 33.2 44.9





Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Figures may not sum to totals because of rounding.
b. Expressed as an annual rate.
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output with the 1990 input package instead of the actual 1998 input pack-
age? In other words, does the 1990 input package cost less at 1998 factor
prices than the 1998 input package? If so, something is wrong.
Of the two tests, the first is the more important for evaluating the
e-capital story. E-capital was available in 1990; the story explains the
small amount that was used by the high relative price of e-capital back
then. Table 3 applies the WACM to data for the beginning and ending years
of my analysis, 1990 and 1998. 
The inputs in the first two rows are normalized by the Divisia index of
input, to adjust for output and productivity growth. The goods and services
sector used much more e-capital in 1998 than in 1990, somewhat more
machines, about the same c-labor, and rather less h-labor. Relative factor
prices moved in accordance with these changes in factor intensities. In par-
ticular, the relative price of c-labor rose dramatically.
Table 3 shows that the e-capital view of the 1990s does satisfy the basic
rationality condition of production economics. The essential question is
why the economy waited until the 1990s to begin to accumulate e-capital.
The e-capital view would fail if the 1998 factor input bundle—which con-
tains quite a bit of e-capital services—could have produced the 1990 level
of output more cheaply (at 1990 prices) than the bundle actually chosen.
The answer, in the middle panel of table 3, is that the 1990 input bundle
was actually cheaper. The adoption of e-capital during the 1990s occurred
because e-capital substituted for expensive c-labor, and e-capital’s price
relative to c-labor was falling at 3 percent a year. For the same reason, it
would not have been economical to use the 1990 input bundle to produce
the 1998 level of output.
Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous discussion has developed three criteria for deciding
whether the e-capital story is plausible: Does it imply nonnegative total
factor productivity growth for goods and services, counting e-capital as
an input? Does it pass the WACM test in 1990? And does it pass the
WACM test in 1998?
The model includes ﬁve parameters whose values are a matter of guess-
work: the cost-of-adjustment parameter for plant and equipment,  
k; the
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e-capital,  e; the rate of productivity growth for making e-capital,  ; and
the annual rate   at which Tobin’s q returns toward its normal level of
one. Table 4 shows the result of doubling and of halving each of these
parameter values while holding the others at their initial level. In all cases
where the parameter is doubled, the change violates one of the above three
criteria. All doublings except that of  k drive productivity growth negative,
and always by more than a trivial amount (ranging from –0.2 percent a
year to –0.6 percent a year). All but the doubling of   cause a violation of
the second WACM condition that the 1998 input bundle be cheaper at 1998
prices than the 1990 bundle.
Halving the adjustment cost for plant and equipment drives productiv-
ity growth negative, because it increases measured e-capital accumulation.
Halving the rate of productivity growth for making e-capital causes a fail-
ure of the second WACM test, because e-capital is then not cheap enough
94 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
Table 3. Calculations for the Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization Test
Billions of 1998 dollars, except where noted otherwise
Physical College Non–college
Item E-capital capital graduates graduates Total
Inputs, 1990a 482 3,781 902 1,966
Inputs, 1998a 2,701 4,083 701 1,625
Prices, 1990b 0.180 0.193 0.693 0.835
Prices, 1998b 0.212 0.215 1.000 1.000
First WACM test: is a unit of 1990 output cheaper to produce with 1990 than with 
1998 inputs?
Cost of 1990 output at  87 730 625 1,641 3,083
1990 prices
Cost of 1990 output at  486 789 486 1,356 3,117
1998 prices
Difference –399 –58 139 285 –34
Second WACM test: is a unit of 1998 output cheaper to produce with 1998 than with 
1990 inputs?
Cost of 1998 output at  572 876 701 1,625 3,775
1990 prices
Cost of 1998 output at  102 811 902 1,966 3,781
1998 prices
Difference 470 65 –200 –341 –7
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
a. Normalized by the Divisia index of input.
b. For capital, 1998 dollars per 1998 dollar of capital; for labor, 1998 = 1.0.
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perturbations causes a violation of the ﬁrst WACM condition.
Skill-Biased Technical Change
Previous research on the combination of rising relative wages and rising
relative employment levels of more-skilled or more-educated workers has
gravitated toward the idea of skill-biased technical change.
22 Other expla-
nations—notably, rising competition from low-wage workers in other parts
of the world—receive little support. The e-capital model developed in
this paper is an extension of the idea of skill bias, not a replacement for
it. If e-capital were not durable—if it were a standard intermediate prod-
uct—the two-sector e-capital model could be rewritten as a one-sector
model relating output of goods and services to inputs of primary factors. 
The durability of e-capital improves the explanatory power of skill-
biased technical change in two ways. First, it helps align observed rapid
rates of wage growth for college graduates with low observed rates of total
factor productivity growth. Accumulation of e-capital fills in the differ-
Robert E. Hall 95
Table 4. Sensitivity of Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization Tests 
to Parameter Selection
Are 1990  Are 1998 
Is productivity inputs cheaper  inputs cheaper 
Baseline Alternative growth at 1990 at 1998
Parameter value valuesa nonnegative? prices? prices?
 k 3.00 6.00 Yes Yes No
1.50 No Yes Yes
 e 3.00 6.00 No Yes No
1.50 Yes Yes Yes
 e 0.06 0.12 No Yes No
0.03 Yes Yes Yes
  0.03 0.06 No Yes Yes
0.02 Yes Yes No
  0.20 0.40 No Yes No
0.10 Yes Yes Yes
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Alternative values are either double or half the baseline values.
22. See Katz and Autor (1999).
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in the stock market, a factor not previously considered in the skill bias
literature.
Consider the following technology:
where x is an index of c-worker-augmenting technical change and A the
index of Hicks-neutral technical change. The wage of c-workers per
efﬁciency unit is  . The elasticity of substitution between c-workers
and h-workers,  , is given by
Given a value for the elasticity, one can infer the bias in technical
change from observable data according to 
Equation (17) reflects the well-known proposition that the bias of techni-
cal change is not defined when the elasticity of substitution is unity, as in
the Cobb-Douglas technology. Notice that the bias would go in the wrong
direction—contradicting the observed increase in relative wages and
increase in relative employment rates for c-workers—if the elasticity of
substitution were less than one. With an elasticity not too much higher than
one, the bias will be a high multiple of the relative wage increase and of
the relative employment increase.
Another restriction on an interpretation based on biased technical
change is that it should not involve technical regress: both the index of 
c-worker augmentation, x, and the index of output augmentation, A, should
rise over time. Equivalently, one could say that productivity growth of both
kinds of labor must be positive. The Solow residual for this technology is
  ln A + s
c   ln x, where s
c is the share of c-workers. The condition for
nonnegative output augmentation is that   ln x not exceed the Solow
residual divided by s
c. With productivity growth at a 0.9 percent annual
rate and the share of c-workers at 33 percent (both from the lower panel
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tions, with the elasticity of substitution on the horizontal axis.
The hypothesis of skill-biased technical change cannot be made inter-
nally consistent for any value of the elasticity of substitution, although
high values of the elasticity bring the rate of skill bias close to the cutoff
level. For example, if the elasticity of substitution between c-workers and
h-workers is 4, bias growth is about 3.9 percent a year, which would con-
tribute growth of 1.3 percent a year in the Solow residual, well above the
observed growth of 0.9 percent a year.
These calculations demonstrate that the hypothesis of growth in the
skill bias of the technology has trouble explaining the striking fact that
the relative wages of college-educated workers have risen despite rapid
growth in their employment relative to workers without college. Again, the
model developed earlier in this paper is an elaboration of the idea of skill
bias. Rather than placing the skill bias directly in the single aggregate
production function, the model considers the accumulation of e-capital. 
The discussion based on the technology of equation (15) applies only to
the case of two factors, where the elasticity of substitution is a property
of the technology and cannot be negative. With more factors whose prices
are changing over time,   in equation (16) can take on any value; it loses
its connection with any property of the technology. In the three-factor case
without e-capital, one could try to explain the movements of employment
and wages through changes in physical capital. However, I am not aware
that any explanation of events in the labor market in the 1990s and earlier
has been offered along those lines. In the four-factor case with e-capital,
the opportunities to explain the movement of relative wages and relative
employment levels in the same direction are richer. In particular, if
e-capital and c-workers are complements, then increases in the amount of
e-capital will raise the marginal product of c-workers and permit wages
to move in the same direction as employment. The only restriction that
production theory imposes on the movements of factors and their prices
is the WACM, tested in the previous section.
The Relation between Stock Market Value and 
Education by Industry
It would be difficult to reproduce the results of this paper at the indus-
try level. A primary obstacle is that many ﬁrms are active in several indus-
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these various industries. Although data from Compustat can be compiled
by industry, the resulting data are full of artifacts from movements of pro-
duction units from one industry to another as the units change corporate
ownership. Compustat also suffers from varying reporting rates over time
for the stock of plant and equipment. It would be even more difficult to
reproduce the results by ﬁrm, as data on education by ﬁrm are utterly lack-
ing. Nonetheless, I have taken a look at the relation between securities val-
ues and work force education by industry.
Jason Cummins provided a tabulation of the firms in the Compustat
database in 1998, from which I calculated a rough approximation to the
value of their e-capital. I calculated a firm’s e-capital as the market value
of its equity plus the book value of its debt less the replacement value of its
plant and equipment and the book values of its inventories and net cur-







Rate of growth implied by actual growth of
relative employment and relative wages 
Rate of growth that implies zero rate of output augmentation
Elasticity of substitution
2468 1 0
Figure 8. Rate of Growth of Bias Favoring College Graduates as a Function of the
Elasticity of Substitutiona
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Over the period 1990–98.
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k and q
e are both one,
and so it ignores the effects of q on valuation.
To measure the fraction of workers in each industry who have com-
pleted college, I tabulated the 1 percent public use sample of the 1990 Cen-
sus of Population. I drew a sample of states, with sampling probabilities in
proportion to population. Then I tabulated data for the 64,000 workers
reported for the sampled states. The statistical sampling errors of the
resulting estimated proportions of college graduates are close to zero.
For many industries there are gross discrepancies between the industry
employment data reported in Compustat and employment reported in data
based, like those of the census, on the industry of the employing estab-
lishment rather than the corporate owner. In a sample of industries where
I judged that public corporations accounted for the bulk of employment, I
found that employment reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
establishment survey was about 150 percent of Compustat employment. I
rejected industries that fell outside a wide band around this value, from a
ratio of 1 to a ratio of 4. Thus I included industries where Compustat
employment was between a quarter and all of BLS employment. In other
industries the census data on the fraction of workers who had graduated
from college would be dangerously irrelevant. Twenty-two industries at
the two-digit classiﬁcation level survived this cut.
Table 5 shows the results of these calculations. The data on the per-
centage of workers who have graduated from college contain few sur-
prises. At the low end are food stores and low-technology manufacturing
industries such as paper and steel. The industries where more than a quar-
ter of workers are college graduates provide business and financial ser-
vices. E-capital per worker is plainly positively related to college-graduate
intensity. Figure 9 shows the relationship as a graph. 
Regression of e-capital value on the number of workers with a college
education produces a coefficient of $986,000, with a standard error of
$386,000. This figure is more than double the average compensation for
college-graduate workers over the eight-year period. Even with an
allowance for the effect of q
e of about a factor of 1.5 (see figure 6), the
value of e-capital created per college-graduate worker exceeds the cost of
employing the worker. But the most inﬂuential observations in table 5 are
for financial services industries, where college graduates are paid more
than in other industries, so the discrepancy may not be too great.
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that college graduates—makers of e-capital—tended to be employed in
those industries where e-capital, in the view of the stock market, was
actually being made. Many of these college-graduate-intensive, high-
e-capital industries—notably engineering and management services—are
also computer-intensive industries. These results add to Jorgenson and
Kevin Stiroh’s evidence that the negative values of productivity growth in
computer-using industries are probably the result of errors in the price
data.23
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Table 5. Share of Workers with a College Degree, 1990, and Estimated E-Capital per
Worker, 1998, by Industry
Units as indicated
Workers with a  E-capital per 
SIC college degree worker (thousands
codea Industry (percent) of 1998 dollars)
54 Food stores 7.0 26
14 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels 10.6 36
26 Paper and allied products 10.6 139
33 Primary metal industries 10.7 11
34 Fabricated metal products 11.7 52
53 General merchandise stores 12.3 41
20 Food and kindred products 13.6 369
13 Oil and gas extraction 13.7 65
56 Apparel and accessory stores 15.9 21
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 15.9 252
59 Miscellaneous retail 19.2 42
38 Instruments and related products 19.6 210
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 19.9 161
48 Communication 20.8 736
78 Motion pictures 21.5 230
45 Transportation by air 23.4 –23
27 Printing and publishing 23.5 124
73 Business services 26.0 192
60 Depository institutions 26.3 978
63 Insurance carriers 32.4 455
61 Nondepository ﬁnancial institutions 43.9 3,450
62 Security and commodities brokers 57.6 558
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; and
Jason Cummins, New York University.
a. U.S. Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation system.
23. Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
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The 1990s saw two remarkable changes in the U.S. economy. One was
the huge increase in the stock market. The other was the rapid growth in
the earnings of college graduates even as these workers came to account
for a substantially larger fraction of the labor force. The natural explana-
tions for these phenomena invoke productivity growth. But growth of
recorded productivity over the decade was only a little above that in the
two preceding decades and well below that in the 1950s and 1960s. Nor
can skill-biased technical change by itself explain the relative earnings and
employment levels of college graduates, because of the relatively low level
of total factor productivity growth.
This paper has developed a view that is consistent with all of these facts.
But it is not yet compelled by these facts. We may learn in coming years
(for example, through a stock market crash) that the high stock market val-
uations were a mistake and that corporations had not accumulated capital
Robert E. Hall 101
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Work force share of college graduates (percent)
Figure 9. E-Capital per Worker and Work Force Share of College Graduates 
by Industry, 1998
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey; and Jason Cummins, New
York University.
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full explanation of, the sharp growth in the relative earnings of college
graduates. 
Nonetheless, I find it more satisfactory to link the two phenomena
through the concept of e-capital. This theory replaces the twist of the pro-
duction function implicit in the skill bias view with a new factor of pro-
duction. It is the comparative advantage of college graduates in making
e-capital, together with the willingness of U.S. residents and foreigners to
finance huge amounts of e-capital, that has driven up their wages, not an
arbitrary change in the production function.
102 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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Discussion
Jason G. Cummins: This is one of the most ambitious papers that I have
ever read. Robert Hall proposes a unified explanation for two of the pre-
eminent economic events in the United States in the last ten years: the
extraordinary rise of the stock market and the increase in the skill premium
to college-educated workers. His explanation is that intangible capital,
which is used predominantly by college graduates, grew at an extraordi-
nary pace in the 1990s. Hence the stock market boom simply reflects the
market value of this intangible capital, and the rise in relative earnings
reﬂects the increased demand for college graduates.
Intangible capital, as it is typically defined, consists of assets such as
patents, copyrights, trademarks, formulas, and brand names. These assets
are built by investment in advertising and in research and development
(R&D). But Hall does not argue that the growth of these types of intangi-
bles is responsible for the stock market boom or the growing wage gap.
Indeed, one quickly realizes why: investment in advertising and R&D,
however broadly measured, has not increased nearly enough to explain
these two events. Nakamura reports that advertising as a proportion of
nonfinancial corporate gross domestic profit grew from 3.9 percent in the
period 1980–89 to 4.1 percent in 1990–97.
1 The comparable figures for
R&D are 2.3 percent in 1980–89 and 2.9 percent in 1990–97. Instead, Hall
introduces another type of intangible asset: e-capital, which is the body
of technical and organizational know-how created by college graduates
using computers and software. The idea that computers and software are
103
1. Nakamura (1999).
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national accounts is not new.
2 The catchy name, however, is.
Unfortunately, nobody really knows what this technical and organiza-
tional know-how consists of. One might think that this would be a rather
substantial obstacle to studying e-capital. But Hall has an ingenious
workaround. He shows that, under certain assumptions, e-capital can be
deﬁned in a purely mechanical way, which obviates the need to say exactly
what it is. Some readers might object that this type of approach is obscu-
rantist. However, this would be misguided, because Hall is very clear
about what his goals are and, perhaps more important, what his goals are
not.
To understand the contribution of this study, it is important to elabo-
rate on this point. In particular, Hall’s goal is not to test whether e-capital
is the link between the stock market and the labor market in the 1990s.
Rather, his goal is to show that e-capital could be the link. Of course,
there is a difference between arguing that there is a way to fashion the
e-capital story so that it is not inconsistent with the data and arguing that
the data compel that story. Hall acknowledges this stricture, but my biggest
concern is that it will go unrecognized by those who read the paper
carelessly.
In my view, the careful reader will see that this paper is a contribution
to aesthetics as much as anything else: Hall has found a way to rational-
ize two phenomena that he thinks is “more satisfactory” than other pos-
sibilities. Whether Hall’s aesthetic conception persuades the reader
depends on three things. First, it depends on whether the assumptions
necessary to make the e-capital story work are realistic. Second, it
depends on whether the story is robust to changes in the way the model
is calibrated. Finally, it depends on whether the story is sufficiently rich
to explain the data. The paper falls short in all three respects. Neverthe-
less, Hall has established a useful benchmark for further research. My
own view is that intangible capital will be an important ingredient in the
compelling explanation that does eventually emerge for the recent behav-
ior of the U.S. stock and labor markets. But it will not be the sole expla-
nation as Hall argues. I discuss below the other ingredients needed in the
mix.
104 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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is that firms operate in perfectly competitive markets with a constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) production technology that uses e-capital among
other factors of production. The second is that the adjustment cost tech-
nology for e-capital is a linear-quadratic function scaled by the quantity
of property, plant, and equipment (PPE). The third is that the rental price
of e-capital depends on the ratio q
e of the price of installed e-capital to the
price of new e-capital, on the rate   at which q
e returns to its equilibrium
value of unity, and on the wage p
e of college graduates measured in effi-
ciency units. And the fourth is that the stock market is strongly efficient
in the sense that equity prices just equal the value of all of the ﬁrm’s pro-
ductive assets, tangible and intangible. If these assumptions are satisfied,
the value of e-capital can be calculated as the difference between the value
of the stock market and the value of PPE. The quantity of e-capital can
then be inferred as the value of e-capital divided by p
eq
e.
I assess these assumptions by thinking about whether they truly
describe the companies that Hall cites as intensive in e-capital, such as
Yahoo! Inc. and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Does his first set of assumptions,
that these companies are perfectly competitive with CRS production tech-
nologies, make sense? To be fair, these assumptions need to hold only
approximately, but they appear not to hold even approximately for the
types of companies that Hall has in mind.
Yahoo! indeed has many competitors, and so the assumption of perfect
competition is not wide of the mark. The assumption of CRS, on the other
hand, is not as innocuous as it may seem. Yahoo!’s e-capital comes from
the way its computers and software organize and deliver information. It is
difficult even to think about what it might mean to double this factor of
production because it is essentially indivisible. CRS may not be as bad an
approximation for Wal-Mart, but a key part of its business model is to build
stores in areas where markups can be sustained, and this would seem to
violate the perfect competition assumption. Hall does not mention
Microsoft, perhaps the premier e-capital-intensive company. Recently,
however, he himself has argued that Microsoft violates the assumptions on
which his model depends: in a recent unpublished paper he calculates
that Microsoft’s market power has cost consumers billions of dollars.
3 If
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attributes to e-capital is overstated.
This discussion of the production technology points up the thornier
issue of how to model e-capital. One way to think about e-capital is as a
nexus of business methods based on information technology. It is clear that
there has been an explosion of such methods, with Yahoo! just one of many
outstanding examples. But Hall treats e-capital very much like any other
quasi-fixed factor of production. Firms buy it just like they buy staplers.
Granted, in Hall’s model college graduates are needed to create e-capital,
whereas physical capital is purchased from suppliers. But e-capital does
not work like this. If Hall and I wanted to start up a dot-com company,
we could not simply replicate Yahoo!’s e-capital by hiring some college
graduates. That is because Yahoo!’s e-capital is a distinct way of combin-
ing the usual factors of production, not an input itself.
To formalize this conception of e-capital, I would begin by expressing
the production technology as 
where A is an index of Hicks-neutral technical change, k is the quantity
of physical capital in efﬁciency units, c is the labor input of college grad-
uates, h is the labor input of other workers, and m is materials. The key
difference between this formulation and Hall’s equation (1) is that the pro-
duction technology, f, depends on e-capital through the index i. This cap-
tures the idea that the output of Yahoo! and, say, Lycos may differ even
though they utilize the same factors of production. It also clarifies why it
makes no sense to ask what are e-capital’s returns to scale and elasticities
of substitution, and why perfect competition may be such a poor approxi-
mation. My formulation is strictly more general than the one Hall adopts,
and so there may be a sensible way to go from mine to his. But that
remains an important open question. The reader can certainly imagine
other technological speciﬁcations that are as compelling as Hall’s.
The second set of assumptions concerns the adjustment cost technology
for e-capital. It is linear-quadratic with a constant deterioration rate. There
is essentially no evidence to support or to refute this choice, perhaps
because, again, e-capital is not really a quasi-fixed factor like PPE. With
that important caveat in mind, the standard linear-quadratic model is a sen-
sible place to start, especially given that research has been inconclusive
() ( , , , ) , 1 qA f k c h m tt i t t t t =
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ignorance, this would also be a good area in which to focus future
research.
The peculiar feature of Hall’s adjustment cost technology is that it
depends inversely on the quantity of PPE. Firms that have the greatest total
and marginal adjustment costs for e-capital investments of the same size
are those with relatively little PPE. So Hall cannot really have companies
like Yahoo! in mind when he talks about e-capital producers. Total and
marginal adjustment costs would approach inﬁnity for ﬁrms with very lit-
tle PPE like Yahoo! Conversely, ﬁrms like General Motors would have tiny
adjustment costs because their stock of PPE is so large. This setup is back-
wards. If it were valid, we would have been reading throughout the 1990s
about gm.com, not Yahoo!
The third set of assumptions involves the rental price of installed
e-capital. Part of my concern about the calculation of the rental price stems
from the assumptions about the production and adjustment cost technolo-
gies that I have already highlighted. The rental price depends on the wage
of college graduates in efficiency units, p
e, and on q
e. Both of these
embody a particular conception of e-capital. First, e-capital can be pur-
chased like any other quasi-fixed input by hiring college graduates. And
second, e-capital is cheaper for ﬁrms with large stocks of PPE.
The remainder of my concern about the rental price is that expecta-
tions are treated haphazardly. Firms are assumed to have perfect foresight
about the future price of uninstalled e-capital. Yet this, for the purposes of
the computations, amounts to assuming that they knew in 1990 the wage
that college graduates would earn in 1999. Moreover, the rate at which q
e
returns to its equilibrium value of unity,  , is determined outside the
model. The latter point also applies to the rental price of PPE since   enters
in the same way.
Hall’s final assumption is that the stock market is strongly efficient.
Most readers of this volume will not have followed the evolution of this
paper, and thus will be unaware of perhaps the most piquant evidence
against this assumption, namely, the fact that Hall has had to continually
revise downward the market capitalization of Yahoo! cited in his ﬁrst para-
graph. When the paper was ﬁrst written, in May of 2000, Yahoo!’s market
capitalization was over $120 billion. By the time the paper was presented
to the Brookings Panel in September, it had dropped to about $72 billion.
As I write this comment it has again fallen by about 50 percent, to $37 bil-
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ciency—Yahoo!’s market capitalization could reﬂect changes in expected
profits or expected returns, or both. But the fall does illustrate a potential
pitfall to Hall’s approach. If equity prices faithfully reflect the value of a
ﬁrm’s e-capital, Yahoo! has destroyed an enormous amount of e-capital in
the last six months.
It is possible that there was a bubble in Yahoo!’s share price and, more
generally, in the share prices of companies that are e-capital-intensive.
There are, in fact, a wide variety of other reasons why asset prices may not
reflect fundamentals; some are consistent with weaker forms of market
efﬁciency, and some are not. But the important point is that the presence of
these reasons would lead Hall to overstate the value of e-capital by the size
of the mismeasurement.
This is easy to illustrate using a variant of Hall’s model. The funda-
mental value of the ﬁrm Vt* is equal to the sum of the value of PPE and the
value of e-capital: Vt* = qt
kkt + qt
eet. Suppose that the firm’s stock market
value Vt
E differs from its fundamental value by mt, perhaps because of a
bubble. In this case, Vt
E = Vt* + mt. When the stock market value of the ﬁrm




eet + mt. Hence, Hall’s decomposition yields qt
eet + mt as the
value of e-capital instead of qt
eet.
Based on these four sets of assumptions, Hall then develops a two-
pronged empirical approach. In the first part of this investigation, Hall
chooses technological parameters for which it is logically possible that
e-capital does not violate the weak axiom of cost minimization (WACM).
He shows, however, that the results are sensitive to parameters that are
arguably as reasonable as the ones he chooses. In particular, total factor
productivity is negative, and the WACM test for 1998 is rejected, for most
alternative parameter values. In the second part of the empirical work, Hall
shows that college graduates populate the industries that are e-capital-
intensive. This is reassuring, since it seems to be a necessary condition
for e-capital to lead to an increase in the skill premium.
Finally, the question remains whether the e-capital story is sufficiently
rich to explain the data. At a basic level we know that it is not, because
e-capital is negative for firms whose stock market value is less than the
value of their PPE. In essence, this means that, if we ignore adjustment
costs, e-capital is negative for firms with values of Tobin’s q that are less
than unity. And there are many such firms. Indeed, the median firm had
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2000
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Stephen Bond and myself.
4 It is hard to believe that the 1980s were pre-
dominantly a time when e-capital destroyed value. But this is what one has
to believe if one thinks that the 1990s were predominantly a time when
e-capital generated value.
A similar problem is that the increase in college graduates’earnings rel-
ative to those of non–college graduates did not start in 1990. It started in
the early 1980s and continued in the 1990s. But e-capital cannot explain
the emergence of the skill premium because it was, by and large, negative
in the 1980s. So e-capital is, at best, only a partial explanation.
Hall is led into these apparent contradictions because the e-capital story
is unnecessarily restrictive. There may be periods when the stock market
deviates from fundamentals. In addition, there are other factors of produc-
tion that complement college graduates. Recent research suggests ways to
generalize Hall’s model along these two lines. Bond and Cummins intro-
duce a less restrictive model, incorporating both market mispricing and a
role for intangible capital.
5 They find that intangible capital cannot ratio-
nalize the runup in the stock market from 1982 to 1998. Per Krusell and
others show that complementarity of tangible capital and skill explains the
movements of the skill premium from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s.
6
In summary, I would stress that it is always appealing to look to unob-
servables, like e-capital, to explain apparent paradoxes or anomalies. To
have any degree of confidence in this type of explanation, however, one
has to exploit the testable implications of the dynamic stochastic struc-
ture of the unobservables (as, for example, Bond and Cummins have
done).
7 Until we have a more complete set of these types of results, Hall’s
provocative findings will be interpreted in a variety of ways, depending
on the reader’s bias. To new economy skeptics, they may serve as a sort
of reductio ad absurdum, whereas for the arguments of new economy
enthusiasts they may prove to be the cornerstone. In any case, the lasting
contribution of this study is that it shows that capital accumulation,
broadly conceived, has the potential to rationalize important and seem-
ingly disparate phenomena. Even if Hall falls short of his goal to provide a
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in the 1990s, his approach points the way for how to integrate features of
the new economy into a coherent economic model.
Owen A. Lamont: As usual, Robert Hall has produced a provocative
paper that deftly combines wide-ranging types of evidence and an appeal-
ing theory. I think we can all agree that the ingredients of the story—a high
stock market, new technology, slow apparent productivity growth, high
wages for skilled workers—are both individually and collectively fasci-
nating and must be related somehow.
Hall’s ﬁgure 7 is certainly a thought-provoking picture. It breaks down
the value of the stock market into two components, the value of physical
capital and a residual. The value of physical capital is the cost of physical
capital plus the difference between value and cost. To arrive at this addi-
tional value over cost, it is necessary to estimate Tobin’s q for physical
capital. The traditional estimate of q involves using the market value, but
since Hall wants to save that variable for other uses, he instead infers q
from the quantity of investment in physical capital. Under constant returns
to scale with quadratic investment costs, q is just a function of the adjust-
ment cost parameter and the growth of physical capital. Thus the fact that
figure 7 shows only a modest role for physical capital reflects both the low
quantity of physical capital relative to market value and its relatively
smooth, slow adjustment (as well as Hall’s guess as to the value of the
adjustment parameter).
Although ingenious, this method is not without problems. The main
problem is that investment regressions using q do not work very well, even
when one uses data from before 1990, when e-capital presumably did not
exist. So inferring q from investment seems likely to produce unreliable
estimates of the value of physical capital. Continuing with figure 7, Hall
estimates the value of e-capital as the difference between actual stock mar-
ket value and the imputed value of physical capital. But if the estimates
of the imputed value of physical capital are unreliable, it follows that the
estimates of e-capital are also unreliable.
An example may be helpful. As Stephen Bond and Jason Cummins
reported in the last issue of the Brookings Papers, the Coca-Cola Company
had a q of more than 5 in the late 1980s.
1 Assuming, as Hall does, that
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dratic adjustment costs with constant returns to scale, Coca-Cola should
have been madly adding physical capital in order to produce more output
(and driving its q back toward one). It did not, and we all know why: 
constant-returns-to-scale technology with competitive output markets is a
terrible description of Coca-Cola’s actual situation. 
This example leads me to an important question: what exactly is 
e-capital? As calculated by Hall, it seems as if e-capital is all nonphysical
assets owned by the corporation. Yet the paper’s calculations assume that
e-capital is zero prior to 1990. It seems odd to assume that nonphysical
assets (brand names, advertising, patents, secret formulas, marketing net-
works, and so on) did not exist prior to 1990. Surely throughout the twen-
tieth century many firms in the services industry (such as advertising,
legal, accounting, consulting, and financial services) have had relatively
small amounts of physical capital.
The pre-1990 evidence is fairly compelling on one point: the ratio of
market value to the cost of physical capital (Tobin’s q) varies a lot. Olivier
Blanchard, Changyong Rhee, and Lawrence Summers, for example, found
that q varies wildly, from a low of 0.39 in 1920 to a high of 1.28 in 1936,
and ending, in their series, at 0.9 in 1990.
2 So it is no more than happen-
stance that q was around 1 in 1990, where Hall’s ﬁgure 7 begins.
The paper mentions the puzzle of low stock market valuations in the
1970s and 1980s. An explanation related to e-capital is provided by Jeremy
Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic, who theorize that much of the technol-
ogy revolution was already foreseeable in the early 1970s.
3 In their view,
expectations about the impact of technology caused the decline in the
stock market, as the market expected existing ﬁrms to be driven out by new
ﬁrms. These new ﬁrms, such as Microsoft, did not yet exist and thus were
not traded, and so their values were not yet reﬂected in the market.
Another factor contributing to the fluctuation in q is variance in
expected returns on stocks over time. Expected returns can vary for either
rational reasons (perhaps changes in risk, changes in risk aversion, or
changes in risk sharing) or irrational reasons (overpricing and underpric-
ing). Although there is no consensus on why expected returns vary, there is
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evidence, that they do vary. They are not constant.
It is true, indeed tautological, that the value of any security is due to
future cash ﬂows to holders of the security and future rates of return on the
security. Thus today’s high market value mechanically implies either that
future cash flows are high, or that future returns are low, or some combi-
nation of the two. Using a similar mechanical relation, Tuomo
Vuolteenaho shows that the ratio of market value to book value, which is
roughly equal to Tobin’s q, is a function of future returns on the security in
question and of future corporate profits.
4 He decomposes the variance of
the aggregate market value–book value ratio over the period 1871–1999
and finds that almost all the time-series variation is due to variation in
expected returns, not in expected profits. This result is an important con-
tradiction of the idea that intangible assets are responsible for variation in
q. If these intangible assets are valuable, they should generate corporate
profits in the future. But Vuolteenaho finds that high levels of inferred
intangible assets do not predict future proﬁtability.
Thus one possibility is that q is high because future returns are low.
Indeed, this possibility seemed plausible in 1998 to Hall himself. A para-
phrase of his remarks at a Brookings Panel discussion that year begins as
follows: “If stock market wealth rises due to a decrease in the discount rate
rather than an increase in proﬁt ﬂows, as appears to be the case today.... ”
5
Now, as the Hall of 2000 rightly points out, the different ways of charac-
terizing firm value should be the same in equilibrium. Future discounted
cash flows to security holders should be equal to the value of firm assets.
Under standard assumptions, if the discount rate is low today, ﬁrms should
respond by investing more in physical capital. And there is some evidence
that firms do change their investment in response to changes in expected
risk premiums on their stocks.
6
But again, we go back to the quantitative failure of the standard model
to explain investment. Although constant returns to scale with quadratic
adjustment is certainly a useful model for thinking about and describing
reality, it is far from a complete description. Hence I am not terribly sur-
prised that the standard model is unable to account for the seeming under-
investment in physical capital. There is a lot of truth in the standard model;
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the 1990s. Especially in the late 1990s, firms issued equity and invested,
just as they should in response to high market values. Under many differ-
ent scenarios, including both rationally low discount rates and irrationally
high prices, ﬁrms should increase investment when the stock market goes
up. The failure of the standard model is not in the qualitative prediction
about aggregate investment, which is surely right, but in the quantitative
prediction, which is somewhat off.
The highest honor that economics can bestow is to name an equation,
parameter, model, or residual after its inventor. So let me propose a more
descriptive name for the object that the paper calls e-capital. I propose we
call it “Hall’s residual.” There is a lot of truth to the idea that Hall’s resid-
ual captures important assets that do not appear on the balance sheet, and
Hall presents a useful framework for quantifying the inputs and value of
these assets. These intangible assets, including “electronic” intangibles but
also advertising, patents, and so on, are captured in the residual. But like
all residuals, Hall’s residual contains a diverse collection of factors that we
will never fully understand. The paper goes beyond just identifying a
residual, of course, to nicely tie together the residual with other evidence
on wages and productivity. But it is important to remember that Hall’s
residual is a residual, and as such captures all departures from constant
returns and quadratic adjustment costs.
The paper mentions Yahoo! Inc. as a motivating example. The recent
valuation of technology stocks is indeed a puzzle. I will therefore conclude
with a specific example of mispricing of technology stocks. In calculat-
ing Hall’s residual, the paper adopts the principle that the value of the
stock market equals the value of its component assets. This idea is
extremely important in financial economics, especially when the various
components are themselves tradable. It has various names, such as the
no-arbitrage principle and the law of one price. Arbitrage, defined as the
simultaneous buying and selling of the same asset for two different prices,
is the basis of almost all modern financial theory, including the theories
of option pricing and corporate capital structure.
The example, from my own work with Richard Thaler,
7 suggests that
understanding current market valuations is peculiarly difficult. In March
2000, 3Com Corp. sold about 5 percent of its stake in Palm, Inc., to the
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immediately went from the issue price of $38 a share to $145 a share, and
later rose as high as $165, before ending the day at $95 (all prices rounded
to the nearest dollar). Given the relative number of shares outstanding of
Palm and 3Com, a holder of one share of 3Com stock indirectly owned
1.5 shares of Palm stock. Thus, based on 3Com’s ownership of Palm alone,
at the end of the ﬁrst day of trading, 3Com shares were worth at least $143.
Yet 3Com’s actual value at the end of trading that day was $82 (in fact,
3Com’s stock price fell 21 percent that day from its previous close).
The “stub value,” or implied value of 3Com’s non-Palm assets and busi-
nesses, is the difference between the lower bound of $143 and the
observed price of $82, or −$61. For some reason, the market implicitly
assigned a negative value to 3Com’s other assets. Most puzzling of all,
3Com had publicly announced its intention to spin off its remaining shares
of Palm by the end of the year. Thus, in order to proﬁt from the mispricing,
an arbitrageur would have needed simply to buy shares of 3Com, short
1.5 times that many shares of Palm, and wait less than a year. This appar-
ent near-arbitrage opportunity was not easily exploitable, however,
because of the difﬁculty of shorting Palm.
Using the observed value of 3Com’s assets, Hall’s residual for 3Com on
this date would have been massively negative. Obviously, this example is
a bit unfair since Hall’s approach is designed to explain aggregate facts,
not the prices of speciﬁc stocks. But it suggests that our cherished princi-
ples of value additivity may have broken down in the late 1990s. This
example suggests to me that Hall’s residual may contain a lot of ugly
ingredients, perhaps including mispricing.
General discussion: Several panelists were skeptical of the two central
assumptions of Hall’s analysis: that the market value of physical capital
can be accurately inferred by simply plugging actual investment in plant
and equipment into an inverted q investment equation, and that the differ-
ence between Hall’s implied market value of physical capital and the mar-
ket’s valuation of ﬁrms should be entirely attributed to e-capital. Gregory
Mankiw observed that there is a large literature rejecting q theory.
Although Hall provided a rationalization for the apparent failure of the
theory in the 1990s, the theory did not perform well empirically in the pre-
ceding thirty years either, when, according to Hall, e-capital was not dis-
torting the measurement of firms’capital. Hence Mankiw warned against
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with this skepticism but suggested that Hall’s basic insight, that investment
would be much greater if market values reflected only physical capital,
was correct. Both Mankiw and Glaeser felt that what Hall attributed solely
to e-capital should be attributed to intangibles more generally. Mankiw
proposed running Hall’s equations backward in time, with the possibility
of clarifying whether the technological revolution associated with elec-
tronic devices (as implied by the lowercase “e”) was behind the phenom-
ena described or whether it is instead due to broader effects of intangible
capital. William Brainard observed that, unless Hall’s theory were modi-
fied in some way, his equations would have difficulty during much of the
earlier period, when the quantity of e-capital or intangibles implied by
his procedure would be negative, since investment in physical capital was
positive and the market value of firms was below the replacement cost of
physical capital alone. Hall agreed that the apparatus proposed in the paper
does not give intelligible answers to what was observed during the 1970s.
Matthew Shapiro was sympathetic to the view that current high market
values reflect, at least in part, increased importance of intangibles. He
observed that information technology firms are similar to drug companies,
in which a large fraction of workers are paid for the discovery and devel-
opment of drugs, and market values reﬂect the market’s estimate of returns
to these innovations rather than the returns to physical capital. Such ﬁrms
are not appropriately described by conventional models with constant
returns to scale in production and competitive pricing. Information tech-
nology products, like drugs, have high ﬁxed costs and low marginal costs;
proﬁts from the successful products are quasi-rents, not returns to physical
capital. Glaeser wondered whether such a large fraction of the returns to
intellectual innovations could be going to the firms rather than to the
c-workers who produce the innovations. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
observed that Hall’s story has trouble explaining the slowdown in the
growth of wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in recent
years. According to the e-capital story, one would have expected inequal-
ity to have increased even faster in the second half of the 1990s than in ear-
lier periods.
Daniel Sichel raised a question about the magnitude of Hall’s estimates
of e-capital, since they imply that growth in multifactor productivity
(MFP) was very slow during the 1990s. He believed that technical
progress, particularly in semiconductors and computers, had been quite
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overall MFP growth, Hall’s estimates of e-capital almost surely imply sig-
nificantly negative MFP growth outside those sectors. Sichel wondered
whether Hall’s framework allocated such technological improvement to
the accumulation of e-capital. Gourinchas observed that technological
innovations might have occurred well before they showed up in produc-
tivity improvements. He noted that it normally takes time for ideas to be
embodied in commercial applications, and it is easy to see why in the case
of information technology, where network externalities are likely to be
important, the lags would be especially long. Robert Gordon said he
would be more persuaded by the analysis if Hall could show that the for-
mation of e-capital by c-labor did a good job of explaining the valuation
of e-capital firms relative to other firms. Given the current market valua-
tions of e-capital firms, he also wondered whether the amount of c-labor
required to produce the estimated e-capital for those firms greatly
exceeded actual employment. 
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